Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Functional role, philosophy: we speak of a functional role when we do not know exactly what the object is, that fulfills this role, however, we can describe the function and its impact. See also role, function, function analysis._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Stephen Schiffer on Functional Role - Dictionary of Arguments
I 21 Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties. 1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. 2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role. Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a state-type which has F. ((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.) Schiffer: Type here is always "physically"). >Type/Token. Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types. E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) >Input/output. I 23 Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions. I 26 The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p. I 29 Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes. I 30 Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. >Generalization. I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. >Brian Loar. I 276 N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p." N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. >Uniqueness condition. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. I 34 All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role. Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat". Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". >Acquaintance. I 38 f Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms). I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles. Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
||
> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Functional Role
